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Abstract
Contract farming remains one of the most eﬃcient tools for integrating small-scale farmers into modern food markets.
However, the literature lacks evidence on best practices in designing contracts for food supply chains in developing
countries. The purpose of this study is to analyse the design of an existing contract in the emerging Malawian paprika
sector using a qualitative analytical approach. The study compared a contract design in Malawi’s paprika supply
chain with four similar contracts from the horticultural sector in Malawi, India, Zambia and Cape Verde. This study
employed a thematic qualitative analysis and developed 17 categories for analysing contracts. The findings showed that
the Malawian contract contained in total eleven defined clauses. There were missing clauses that influenced the risk
and power distribution between parties in the contract. The comparison of the Malawian contract with other contracts
revealed that none of the analysed contracts included all clauses necessary for a sustainable and fair relationship. The
study proposed improved contract design and future actions to contribute to decreasing inequalities between parties
engaged in the Malawi’s paprika supply chain. The implications of the study include initiation of changes in public
policies related to contract farming strategies as the findings suggest that vulnerable small-scale farmers might be left
unprotected and generate low gains through supply contracts due to poorly formulated contract clauses.
Keywords: contractual arrangements, developing country, small-scale farmers, thematic analysis
1 Introduction
Contract farming is an institutional arrangement that
integrates farmers into modern food supply chains
through an agreed set of formal rules and informal con-
straints (Minot & Roy, 2007; Narayanan, 2012). The
primary role of contracts is to overcome existing mar-
ket imperfections by providing inputs, credit and exten-
sion services to farmers (Jia & Bijman, 2013; Cai et al.,
2014). Also, contracts might serve to distribute the pro-
duction and marketing risks between the contractor and
farmers (Barrett et al., 2012). Contracts oblige farm-
ers to supply buyers with a particular product of certain
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specifications (Will, 2013). Contracts often establish
terms for product purchase in advance, such as expec-
ted quantities, quality and price (Vermeulen & Cotula,
2010; Barrett et al., 2012).
Contracting can be organised through five diﬀerent
models depending on the parties involved: centralised
(processor/packer and farmers); nucleus estate (con-
tractor, estate and farmers); multipartite (contractor,
public entity, cooperative and farmers); informal (con-
tractors and farmers) or intermediary (contractor, inter-
mediary and farmers) (Eaton & Shepherd, 2001). Fur-
thermore, Bijman (2008) and Will (2013) described
three types of contract farming arrangements. First, in
the market specification contracts, the farmer and con-
tractor agree on the terms of delivery, such as quantities,
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qualities and timing. The farmer bears most of the pro-
duction risk but retains control over the majority of the
production-related decisions. The marketing risk is dis-
tributed between the parties. Second, the production-
management contracts involve transferring a substan-
tial amount of decisions regarding production processes
from the farmer to the contractor. The farmer agrees
to follow the production and input regime suggested by
the contractor as the contractor assumes the most of the
marketing risk. Third, in the resource-providing con-
tracts, the contractor secures the market and the key in-
puts for the production. The inputs are oﬀered as in-kind
credit and their value is recovered upon product delivery
through deduction from the final price. The degree of
control can vary widely in this type of contract.
Recent studies show that contracting increases farm-
ers’ incomes, encourages technology adoption and im-
proves the quality of produce (Jones & Gibbon, 2011;
Fréguin-Gresh&Anseeuw, 2013; Girma&Gardebroek,
2015). In contrast, being under contract can increase
gender imbalance in the household, result in small farm-
ers’ indebtedness or enable contractors to turn small-
scale farmers into dependent labourers (Birthal et al.,
2008; Prowse, 2012). In addition, farmers in developing
countries often lack access to suitable land and related
facilities, such as irrigation and roads needed for eﬃ-
cient contract farming (Reardon et al., 2009; Valipour,
2015a,b). Depending on the contract design, the parties
could receive benefits or carry the risks. For example,
Warning & Hoo (2000) and Narayanan (2012) found
food supply contracts in developing countries ambigu-
ous and one-sided, lacking fairness and farmers’ partici-
pation in the design stage. Contracts are often written in
an incomprehensible technical language and can be de-
signed to favour buyers (Maertens, 2006; Cotula, 2011;
Pultrone et al., 2012). Thus, even if the farmer increases
productivity and the quality levels of the product, the
contractor might capture the entire premium, depriving
the farmer of any meaningful benefits.
More specifically related to the formulation of con-
tract clauses, Pultrone (2012) stated that benefits from
contract farming could diminish if a contract oﬀered
unclear, incomplete and misguiding contract clauses.
Narayanan (2012) questioned whether farmers even
comprehend commitments contained in the clauses.
Barrett et al. (2012) argued that contracting companies
designed and oﬀered contracts to more profitable farm-
ers to reach expected profit levels. In the empirical
literature, Schipmann & Qaim (2011) assessed con-
tracts for pepper in Thailand and concluded that clauses
providing inputs and credits increased the attractiveness
of the contract for farmers. Abebe et al. (2013) explored
preferences of potato farmers in Ethiopia and found that
farmers opted for written contracts, which secured in-
puts, technical assistance and seeds, and had variable
quality and price options.
Current research does not provide suﬃcient evidence
on the best practices in designing contracts for small-
scale farmers in developing countries. The empirical
examples mentioned above refer only to one part of the
contract (preferences for provisions) but do not consider
the whole contract. Thus, there is a lack of research on
how companies design contracts (Brousseau, 2008). Ac-
cording to Smalley (2013), exit options that are given
to small-scale farmers in contracts should be further
explored. Sykuta & Parcell (2002) argued that access
to contract documentation and the privacy surrounding
contracts hindered a better understanding of contracting
issues. Notwithstanding the comprehensive studies on
contract clauses by Prowse (2012) and Pultrone (2012),
and the Legal Guide by UNIDROIT/FAO/IFAD (2015)
that serves as a reference point, the up-to-date, in-depth
empirical research on contract design challenges in de-
veloping countries is scarce. To bridge the existing
knowledge gap, this current study addresses the problem
of contract design in food supply chains using an au-
thentic case from the field and synthesises the available
materials to make inferences. The purpose of this study
is to analyse, through comparison, contract design in
the Malawian sector of paprika (Capsicum annuum L.)
using a qualitative analytical approach. The study an-
swers the following research questions: (i) What is the
structure of the Malawian contract? (ii) What is the con-
tent of the contract under study? and (iii) How does the
Malawian contract diﬀer from similar food supply con-
tracts and how can it be improved? In this study, con-
tract design is defined as the structure and content of the
contract (Furlotti, 2007).
This work contributes to the existing knowledge in
three aspects. First, the study identifies weaknesses of
the contract design and discusses how to improve it to
better serve the needs of small-scale farmers. Second,
the study uses a qualitative research approach, which is
underutilised in developmental and agricultural studies
(Locke & Lloyd-Sherlock, 2011). Third, the study adds
needed empirical evidence to the field by analysing the
design of the entire contract in Malawi and enhances the
overall understanding of contract formulation.
The remaining part of this introductory section fo-
cuses on the economic profile of Malawi and position-
ing of contract farming in the context of the Malawian
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paprika sector. The Republic of Malawi is a low-income
country with a population of around 16.7 million and
US$ 255GDP per capita (World Bank, 2015a,b). About
84% of the population lives in rural areas, while 49% of
the country’s area is devoted to agricultural land (FAO,
2013; UN, 2016). The most important food crops grown
in Malawi between 2011 and 2013 were: cassava, maize
and potatoes (CountrySTAT Malawi, 2016). The crops
with the highest export value in Malawi in 2014 were:
tobacco, sugar, tea and coﬀee (NSO, 2015). Large
landowners produced significant export commodities
and small-scale farmers in Malawi cultivated mainly
food crops and rarely engaged in high-value cash crop
production. The research has more recently focused on
the significance of the paprika sector, which reached
US$ 1.9 million in export value in 2014 and has the
potential to further contribute to Malawi’s trade (Agar
& Chiligo, 2008; NSO, 2015). Rising international de-
mand for paprika made it an attractive export commod-
ity for Malawian small-scale farmers due to their com-
parative advantage in the use of low-input technology
(Kumwenda & Madola, 2005; Makoka et al., 2010).
However, Makoka et al. (2010) found that Malawian
small-scale farmers faced many challenges that con-
strain them from linking with high-value markets and
these included: lack of finance, low productivity, poor
quality and little value addition.
Contract farming was introduced to Malawian small-
scale farmers in the 1980s (UNIDROIT, 2014). Des-
pite multiple eﬀorts, Malawi does not have an oﬃcial
strategy for contract farming. Evidence fromMalawi on
contract farming’s impact is so far limited and mixed.
Chirwa & Kydd (2009) reported that small-scale farm-
ers in the tea sector had insuﬃcient voice and power to
enforce contracts, while Kumwenda & Madola (2005)
found that side-selling represented a significant issue
reported by companies. Hence, one of the main rea-
sons why contract farming has not been successfully
established in Malawi is due to small-scale farmers’
opportunistic behaviour in side-selling (CYE Consult,
2009). Agar & Chiligo (2008) explored contract farm-
ing in Malawi’s cotton, sugar, tea, tobacco and paprika
sector and concluded that contracting increased small-
scale farmers’ income and improved their productiv-
ity. Nevertheless, the authors identified two issues that
severely hindered contract farming operationalisation:
small-scale farmers perceived the contract price as in-
tentionally too low and contractors complained about a
breach of contract terms (Agar & Chiligo, 2008).
The general paprika supply chain in Malawi in-
volved contractors, farmers as suppliers, input pro-
viders, vendors, processors, retailers and further cus-
tomers. The enabling environment consisted of institu-
tional elements (Government) and supporting services
(Universities, consultancy sector, NGOs, civil society,
aid organisations and farmers’ associations). In Central
Malawi, fresh paprika was sold on the green market by
local farmers and in city supermarkets, which sourced
paprika from South African suppliers or local small-
scale farmers on a seasonal basis and through oral agree-
ment. This present study focused on dried paprika for
export regulated via contract farming. Small-scale farm-
ers entered the contract mainly as individuals, while to
a lesser extent, others joined the contract as members
of a farmers’ association since the contractor wanted
to obtain higher volumes of paprika from established
farmers’ associations. The product flow of dried paprika
chain consisted of three phases. First, small-scale farm-
ers delivered whole dried paprika pods to the contractor.
Second, the contractor exported whole dried paprika
pods to the processor in South Africa. In the final phase,
the processor extracted oleoresin from paprika and sup-
plied customers in South Africa and Germany.
The structure of the paprika supply chain in Cen-
tral Malawi was similar to paprika chains in neighbour-
ing Zambia. Stevens (2004) explored the paprika sup-
ply chain in Zambia and found that small-scale farmers
were selling their paprika to the contractor while the en-
abling environment involved donor groups and the Gov-
ernment. The paprika was processed into oleoresin and
further exported to South Africa and Spain (Stevens,
2004). Kabungo & Jenkins (2016) reported that the
contractor in Zambia had a dual role. The contractor
was buying paprika from outgrower small-scale farm-
ers and further selling it on the international export mar-
kets. The contractor was also providing extension ser-
vices to small-scale farmers. A similar pattern can be
observed in both export paprika supply chains inMalawi
and Zambia. It is likely that the described pattern occurs
in other south-eastern African countries, which provides
a foundation for the generalisability of this study’s find-
ings in the form of learned lessons that can be applied in
neighbouring countries.
2 Materials and methods
This study analysed the design of a contract used in
Malawi’s paprika supply chain through comparisonwith
four other contracts. The study uses the terms studied
contract and Malawian contract interchangeably to de-
note the contract that is the subject of the paper and to
distinguish among diﬀerent contracts. Due to confiden-
tiality, the study refers to the contractor using the term
Company.
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The total of five contracts were analysed for the study.
The emphasis of this paper is on the design of the
paprika contract physically obtained during the inter-
view with the Company’s senior extension oﬃcer in
Malawi in November 2014 1. The remaining four con-
tracts were retrieved as secondary data from the FAO
contract farming online database (FAO, 2016a,b,c,d).
Since food supply contracts are unique in their con-
text, the sample of contracts used for comparison had
to resemble similar conditions as the studied contract.
The selection criteria for the contracts obtained from the
FAO database included: (i) the contract had to be ad-
ministered in a developing country; (ii) the contract had
to involve farmers and buyers; and (iii) contract had to
relate to a horticultural crop. The number of contracts
from the FAO database was restricted to four to allow
for an in-depth analysis and comparison. The FAO on-
line database already contained a sample of the Com-
pany’s contract for paprika in Malawi used in 2010/11
season, but in practice, it was replaced by a new contract
received during fieldwork. The remaining three con-
tracts originated fromZambia (between a group of farm-
ers and a purchaser of paprika for the 2003/04 season),
India (between an individual farmer and a processing
and exporting company for fruits and vegetables) and
Cape Verde (between an individual farmer and a buyer
of fruits and vegetables).
2.1 Contract setting
The studied contract outlines the relationship between
the Company and the small-scale paprika farmers. The
Company was established in 2008 and started com-
mercial paprika farming in 2010 after the acquisition
of a Malawi-based company that previously dealt with
paprika. The Company oﬀered its contracts for cultivat-
ing paprika to small-scale farmers (outgrowers) in 2010
and building on the existing outgrower programme from
the acquired company. The main motivating factors to
start contractingwith paprika involved: suitable climatic
conditions for growing paprika; market demand for
paprika; suitable infrastructure in place from the previ-
ous company; and the suitability of paprika farming for
small-scale farmers unlike other cash crops (tea, coﬀee
and sugar) that require plantations. Apart from its own
estates, the Company sourced paprika from 10,000–
15,000 small-scale farmers across Malawi. Small-scale
farmers produced 65% more volume of paprika com-
pared to the amount grown on the Company’s estates.
Paprika is the Company’s biggest export cash crop and
1 The fieldwork addressed numerous issues beside the contract
design but the topics are beyond the scope of this paper.
it accounts for 15–20% of Company’s net sale. The im-
portance of paprika stems from its potential to generate
high income from small land area. The Company has a
long-term trading relationship with the processing com-
pany in South Africa where it sells the majority of dry
paprika from Malawi. The Company sells paprika to
other traders in South Africa in smaller volumes. Dur-
ing the course of the study, the Company was the only
oﬃcial contractor for dried paprika in Malawi’s Central
Region. The Company oﬀered a written, nucleus es-
tate model, production-management outgrower contract
type. The purpose of the contract was to ensure a reli-
able supply of quality dry paprika from the small-scale
farmers who followed precise production guidelines.
The two-page contract in English was distributed on be-
half of the Company through extension oﬃcers.
2.2 Analytical framework
The design of the five contracts was analysed using a
template style of thematic qualitative analysis. A quali-
tative approach was applied due to characteristics of the
material: contracts represent rich textual data, which
reflect economic relationships through words, patterns
and subtle meanings. Thematic analysis was used to
identify, analyse and report themes emerging from se-
lected contracts (see Braun & Clarke (2006) for the six
phases followed in thematic analysis). A particular type
of thematic analysis employed in this study was the tem-
plate analysis, which combines a relatively high degree
of structure in analysing the textual data and the pos-
sibility to adapt to a specific study (King, 2012). The
coding template was developed using the Company’s
contract and it was then applied, revised and re-applied
to the remaining four contracts, providing the consist-
ency and direction in the overall analysis. The study
used both inductive and deductive approaches to cod-
ing (see Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). NVivo™ 10
software facilitated the organisation and codification of
the data. Contracts were first coded openly and focused
on categories identified in the raw data and afterwards
categories were refined to align with categories found in
the literature.
The template analysis resulted in identification of
contract categories (clauses), which were interpreted
and developed into themes. The themes were divided
in three main groups: (i) contract structure, (ii) con-
tract content and (iii) comparison of designs. The theme
labelled as contract structure was further classified in
three sub-themes: defined, partially defined and missing
clauses. The Company’s contract was analysed in-depth
while the other four contracts served primarily for com-
parison purposes.
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3 Results
3.1 Contract structure
Central features of the contract were the Company’s
and the small-scale farmer’s obligations and general
conditions. The Company’s obligations included: or-
ganising purchasing points; purchasing the crop; de-
termining grades; paying for the crop; and training the
small-scale farmers. The small-scale farmer’s obliga-
tions included: cultivating the crop; adhering to chem-
ical usage instructions; grading; and selling the crop.
General conditions were defined around quality failure,
breach of contract and liability clauses. Table 1 displays
the main contract clauses.
3.1.1 Defined clauses
The first part of the studied contract (2013/14 season)
identified parties who had entered into an agreement.
The contract continued with an outline of the nature of
the relationship between parties and the exact duration
of the contract. Under the general conditions, the con-
tract defined the following clauses: consequences in the
case of quality failure, clarification of breach of con-
tract and the Company’s disclaimer of liability regard-
ing the price guarantee, input provisions and any inci-
dents that might occur. The amount of paprika expected
from small-scale farmers was emphasised several times
throughout the contract. The contract specified the pay-
ment conditions and mandatory instructions on crop cul-
tivation for small-scale farmers. The contract concluded
with signatures of parties and their representatives.
3.1.2 Partially defined clause
The contract examined in this study partially defined
the price. The clauses related to the price were men-
tioned twice in the contract: under the Company’s ob-
ligations and within general conditions. In both cases,
the amount to be reimbursed to small-scale farmers was
not specified. However, clauses indicated the procedure
for price determination. The delimitation of the Com-
pany’s responsibility for price guarantee was explicitly
stated in the contract.
3.1.3 Missing clauses
The clause that defined diﬀerent grades for delivered
paprika was not included in the studied contract. In add-
ition, the contract did not specify conditions for ter-
mination of the agreement. Reference to the applicable
law and options for settling possible disputes between
parties were not contained in the contract. The contract
also did not involve the clause that clarified responsibil-
ities in the case of force majeure events.
3.2 Contract content
The preamble of the contract defined that the out-
grower entered the contract with an aim of growing con-
tracted paprika for, and on behalf of, the Company. The
agreed contract lasted for one season, which started on
the day of purchase of the seeds and continued until the
last part of the crop was sold. The seeds were the only
input supplied through the contract and the Company
sold packets of seeds to outgrowers on a cash basis. The
crop in the contract was defined as all paprika that was
produced from the purchased seeds packets. The con-
tract stipulated that the outgrower was obliged to sell
the entire crop exclusively to the Company. Grading
was determined on the marketing day, where a complete
description for each grade was provided (but not con-
tained in the written contract), and parties agreed on the
identified grades. The Company retained the right to de-
termine the price. The price was influenced by the world
market price, fluctuation in exchange rates and demand
for paprika. The Company was obliged to make cash
payments to the outgrower on the day of purchase or
within two weeks. In addition, the Company organised
central purchasing points not more than 30 kilometres
from the original growing area if outgrowers delivered
at least three tonnes of paprika.
The contract included training on cultivation and
grading practices provided by the Company and the
Ministry of Agriculture. The outgrower agreed to follow
the Company’s instructions, especially on recommen-
ded chemical usage. The failure to deliver the agreed
quality of the crop was regulated through the contract
by the Company’s right to reduce the price of the crop,
downgrade the crop or reject the crop. Moreover, the
contract defined two cases for breach of contract. First,
the outgrower breached the contract if paprika was not
sold to the Company. Second, the Company breached
the contract if the contracted paprika was not purchased.
The liability clauses were defined in the form of a
disclaimer. The Company claimed no responsibility for
an outgrower’s injury, health issues or death during the
growing and transporting processes. The Company was
not liable for the supply of inputs, such as chemicals,
fertilisers or finances. The Company did not guarantee
the price at which the paprika would be purchased. The
signatory clause required the contract to be signed un-
der the condition that each party had read and fully un-
derstood the content. The signing parties included the
chairperson and secretary of the farmers’ association,
one of the Company’s representatives and a witness.
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Table 1: A comparison of the design of selected supply contracts
Clause Malawi (2013/14) Malawi (2010/11) Zambia India Cape Verde
Crop Paprika Paprika Paprika Fruits and
vegetables
Fruits and
vegetables
Type Production-
management
Production-
management
Resource-
providing
Resource-
providing
Production-
management
Parties Outgrower
(individual or
group), the
Company
Outgrower
(individual or
group), company
Small-scale
growers (group),
purchaser
Farmer
(individual),
company
Seller (individual),
buyer
Preamble Outgrower grows
paprika for, and on
behalf of, the
Company
Outgrower grows
paprika for, and on
behalf of, company
Purchaser contracts
the grower to
produce the crop
Farmer desires to
enter into
agreement with
company
Seller oﬀers to
supply buyer, and
buyer agrees to
purchase the goods
Applicable law X X X Defined Defined
Duration One season One season One season One year;
extendable by
company
Indicated number
of years
Termination X X X Inputs misuse,
quality failure in
two consecutive
seasons
Failure to supply or
purchase, force
majeure, breach
Input provision Seeds only; cash in
advance
Seeds only; cash in
advance
Optional: seeds,
chemicals and
credit
Seeds, fertilisers
and plant
protection
chemicals; written
proof
X
Quantity All crop grown
using seeds sold by
the Company
All crop produced
by the outgrower
All crop, including
surpluses above
agreed quantity
All crop produced
on agreed acreage
Amount/kg defined
Description of
grades
X ∗ Four grades
described
Four grades
described
X ∗ Seven grades
described
Payment method Cash; immediately
or within two
weeks
Cash; immediately
or within two
weeks
Deduction +
interest; within 15
work days
X Cash, cheque, or
bank transfer
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Table 1: A comparison of the design of selected supply contracts (continued)
Clause Malawi (2013/14) Malawi (2010/11) Zambia India Cape Verde
Price Company’s
decision; based on
the prevailing
market prices,
currency
fluctuation, and
demand; split by
grade; not
explicitly defined;
no bargaining
Defined; fixed
minimum
amount/kg; split by
grade; no
bargaining
Defined; fixed
amount/kg; no
bargaining
Company’s
decision;
amount/kg; split by
grade; not
explicitly stated; no
bargaining
Defined; fixed
amount/kg, but
dependent on
grade; mutual
negotiation in case
market price
changes ± 10%
compared to
contract price
Training Instructions by the
Company and third
party, especially on
grading and
cultivation
Instructions by
company and third
party, especially on
grading and
cultivation
Instructions,
newsletters, and
educational visits
by purchaser
Instructions by
company
X
Quality failure Downgrading;
price reduction;
rejection
Downgrading;
price reduction;
rejection
Downgrading;
price adjustment;
rejection; charging
Contract
termination and
return of provided
inputs
X
Breach Side-selling;
purchase refusal
Side-selling Side-selling
(monetary penalty)
Side-selling
(implicitly)
X
Liabilities Outgrower:
cultivation,
chemical usage,
grading, selling;
Company:
purchase
Outgrower:
cultivation,
chemical usage,
grading, selling;
company: purchase
Grower:
cultivation,
chemical usage,
delivery, selling;
purchaser:
purchase
Farmer:
cultivation,
grading, selling;
company: input
provision, purchase
Seller: cultivation,
delivery, selling;
buyer: purchase
Disputes X X X Amicably;
arbitration
Amicably;
mediation
Force majeure X X X No party is liable;
farmer must repay
the loan
No party is liable;
contract can be
terminated
Signatory Association,
Company, witness
Company,
outgrower, witness
Purchaser, grower,
witness
Farmer, company,
witness
Seller, buyer,
witness
∗ The price in the contracts was spilt by grades but grades’ characteristics were not described in the contract.
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3.3 Comparison of contracts
In this section, the clauses of the studied contract
are compared with clauses in selected contracts from
Malawi, Zambia, India and Cape Verde. The first part of
this section emphasises the diﬀerences in two Malawian
contracts.
3.3.1 Diﬀerences in the contract structure of two
Malawian contracts
The structure of the compared contracts varied con-
siderably in four key aspects. First, the contract from
the 2010/11 season outlined the minimum price for each
of four grades listed in the contract. As noted earlier,
the studied contract partially defined the clause on price
and did not include grades. Second, regarding breach
of contract, the studied contract expanded on the con-
tract from 2010/11 and included the statement that the
Company breaches the contract if it does not purchase
the contracted crop. Third, the studied contract con-
tained the clause specifying English as the working lan-
guage. Fourth, while the contract in 2010/11was signed
between the Company and the outgrower as an indi-
vidual, the 2013/14 contract required the signatures of
representatives of the farmers’ association. The rest of
the clauses appeared in both Malawian contracts and re-
mained similar in their content, thus the recent contract
(2013/14 season) is the subject of further analysis.
3.3.2 Comparison of the studied Malawian contract
with three similar contracts
The contracts from Malawi and Cape Verde were
classified as production-management contracts while
the Zambian and Indian contracts were resource-
providing contracts. Table 1 shows that the Malawian
contract did not diﬀer from similar food supply con-
tracts regarding the parties involved - all contracts were
made between companies and individuals or groups.
The preamble of both the Malawian and Zambian con-
tracts emphasised the farmers’ obligations to cultivate
the crop for the contractor, while contracts from In-
dia and Cape Verde defined the contractual relationship
through an oﬀer and acceptance form, i.e. the farmer
oﬀered to cultivate the crop and the company accepted
the oﬀer.
All contracts explicitly defined the duration of the
agreement. Only the Indian contract included the pos-
sibility to extend the contract. The contracts showed
specific variations in the provision of inputs as a re-
sult of diﬀerent types of contracts and their purposes.
The Malawian contract included the provision of seeds
exclusively and the contract from Cape Verde did not
involve any inputs. The contracts from Zambia and In-
dia involved seeds, fertilisers, chemicals and cash credit.
The required crop quantities diﬀered across contracts.
The Malawian and Zambian contracts demanded the
whole crop to be delivered to the contractor. In the Zam-
bian case, even surpluses above the determined quantity
had to be sold to the contractor. In the Indian contract,
farmers were obliged to deliver the entire crop produced
on an agreed acreage, while the Cape Verde contract
defined the expected quantity in kilogrammes.
Price and grade clauses also varied among contracts.
The Malawian and Indian contract did not describe
grades. In contrast, the contracts from Zambia and
Cape Verde provided detailed descriptions of four and
seven grades respectively. The price in the contracts was
either depended on market conditions or defined as fixed
amount per kilogrammes. In the cases ofMalawi and In-
dia, the contracting companies decided on the price, and
although not explicitly defined in the contract, the price
was split by grades. Only the Cape Verdean contract in-
cluded a clause on mutual renegotiation if the market
price declined or increased 10% compared to the con-
tract price.
Diﬀerent payment methods were found in the com-
pared contracts. The contracts from Malawi and Cape
Verde provided cash payments to the farmers. While the
Indian contract did not define any payment method, the
Zambian contract involved the principle where the fi-
nal price was subject to deductions based on input costs
and interest rate. The Malawian and Indian contracts
provided training on good agricultural practices. The
contract in Zambia included newsletters and educational
visits for outgrowers. If the delivered crop did not sat-
isfy quality standards, contractors in Malawi, Zambia
and India had the option to downgrade the crop, adjust
the price, reject the crop or automatically terminate the
contract. The Cape Verdean contract did not define ac-
tions in the case of quality failure.
Side-selling was considered as a breach of contract in
the Malawian, Zambian and Indian contracts. In Zam-
bia, side-selling incurredmonetary repercussions for the
grower. Within all contracts, farmers had obligations
to cultivate and sell the crop. All contracts obliged the
contractor to purchase the contracted crop under agreed
quality standards. In the Indian contract, the company
was liable for input provision.
The Malawian and Zambian contracts did not define
clauses related to the applicable law, contract termina-
tion, dispute settlements and force majeure. In contrast,
the Indian and Cape Verdean contracts included those
clauses. The company in India had the right to terminate
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the contract if the outgrower failed to deliver a quality
crop for two periods or misused the provided inputs. In
the contract from Cape Verde, each party could termin-
ate the contract if one party failed to deliver or purchase
the crop, in the case of breach of contract and if force
majeure events occurred. In the case of India and Cape
Verde, disputes between the parties were first resolved
amicably, while the second stage of the settlement in-
volved arbitration and mediation respectively. In the
Indian and Cape Verdean contracts, neither party was
considered liable for the force majeure events. In India,
the outgrower had to repay a given loan, while in Cape
Verde force majeure was a valid foundation for contract
termination.
The signatory clauses in the contracts from Zambia,
India and Cape Verde required signatures from the com-
pany, the outgrower and at least one witness. In contrast,
the Malawian contract did not require the outgrower to
directly sign the contract, as the signatory clause re-
ferred to the representatives of the farmers’ association.
4 Discussion
4.1 Contractual completeness
The Malawian contract did not include clauses cover-
ing grades, applicable law, dispute settlement, exit op-
tions and force majeure. Thus, the Malawian contract
had a certain degree of incompleteness, which is inevit-
able in almost all the contracts. The incompleteness in
many contracts occurs mostly due to ex-ante and ex-post
transaction costs related to drafting and enforcing con-
tracts, asymmetric information and parties’ bounded ra-
tionality (Hart, 1988; Hart & Moore, 2008). According
to Hart (2010), the reason for leaving a contract incom-
plete might be to take advantage of an agent’s cognitive
limitations. Nevertheless, omitting some clauses in the
contract is justified when the excluded clauses do not
introduce additional risks or inequalities for the parties
involved.
Defining the price of paprika in the studied contract
involved some challenges for the Company. As an ex-
port commodity, the price of paprika is influenced by
international prices and currency fluctuations. The com-
parison of the two contracts from Malawi revealed that
the contract from 2010/2011 season included the defini-
tion of the price clause, which was not done in the con-
tract from 2013/2014 season. Apart from identifying
the parties and the objectives of the agreement, general
contract law does not impose any requirements regard-
ing the contract form (UNIDROIT/FAO/IFAD, 2015).
One may infer that contracts do not necessarily need to
include the price clause. In the Malawian contract, the
Company retained the right to decide solely on the price
based on market conditions. By doing so, the Com-
pany reduced its marketing risk and increased small-
scale farmer’s vulnerability to fluctuations on the inter-
national market. The Malawian contract required the
entire crop to be sold to the Company at the market
price corrected for currency fluctuations. Thus, the con-
tract provided a secure outlet for small-scale farmer’s
produce but did not oﬀer a stable or premium price.
In addition, the contract did not involve the possibil-
ity to bargain over the price. According to the exist-
ing price clause, the small-scale farmer signing the
Malawian contract accepted the risk that volatile inter-
national prices would shape the final price paid by the
Company.
The literature on contracts provides further explan-
ations on the price clause. In some cases, the con-
tractors may outline the pricing mechanism in the con-
tract. However, the pricing formula might be too com-
plex and the real extent of the price premium for the
small-scale farmer can be disguised (Pultrone, 2012).
Small-scale farmers rarely participate in price determin-
ation and their bargaining power is often reduced since
they cannot assess whether the price paid represents an
appropriate remuneration (Echánove & Steﬀen, 2005).
In cases where the price is not stated and is left to be
shaped by the market as in the Malawian contract, the
companies might closely track market trends to set de-
livery dates to favour low prices (da Silva, 2005). The
consequences of inadequately defined and paid price via
the contract might result in side-selling or cessation of
production of that commodity (Baumann, 2000).
Omitting grades impacted the fairness of the
Malawian contract to the least extent. International
traders in the paprika sector tend to follow existing
American Spice Trade Association (ASTA) guidelines
that specify industry standards for spice quality and are
known for ASTA colour values (ASTA, 2016). There-
fore, the grades for paprika do not change as often as
the price. Even though the contractor is usually familiar
with ASTA specifications, small-scale farmers may lack
access to essential information concerning grade levels.
In this regard, the Malawian contract included training
on grading for small-scale farmers and reduced the in-
formation asymmetry between the parties.
Nevertheless, it is argued in the literature that clauses
on quality and grades are open to manipulation, which
often causes disputes between companies and farm-
ers (Eaton & Shepherd, 2001; Echánove & Steﬀen,
2005). There are three main reasons why companies
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might want to control these clauses. First, by arbitrar-
ily controlling classification of commodities, companies
might downgrade some proportion of the high-quality
commodity into a second grade to obtain more quality
products at a lower price (Baumann, 2000). Second, the
price of the commodity on the market might be lower
and companies could be tempted to supply the produce
from the open market or export; thus, companies may
‘invent’ rigorous quality standards and reject a small-
scale farmers’ commodity (Pultrone, 2012). Third, in
some cases the market for the commodity might be sat-
urated and to reduce the risk of buying a contracted com-
modity with an uncertain market, companies might raise
the quality standards to create a barrier for farmers’ pro-
duce with an intention to reject it (Imbruce, 2008).
The Malawian contract did not define applicable law
governing the contract. Hence, it is unclear which jur-
isdiction applied when interpreting and enforcing the
contract. Also, the contract did not describe proced-
ures for dispute settlement, so it was not possible to de-
termine each parties’ rights and responsibilities if dis-
agreements arose. The Company is likely to have an
advantage in directing dispute settlements by influen-
cing either arbitration or mediation due to higher fi-
nancial and information capacities. Small-scale farm-
ers and even farmers’ associations may be reluctant to
pursue legal claims because of the costs involved in tak-
ing legal actions against the Company. The Legal Guide
by UNIDROIT/FAO/IFAD (2015) confirms that the dis-
pute settlement clause is among the ones most prone to
manipulation in agricultural contracts. Pultrone (2012)
further highlighted the importance of a clear definition
of both dispute settlement clause and the law guiding
the contract by suggesting that the contract should be
explicit about which national law will govern the dis-
pute settlement if parties come from diﬀerent countries.
Since the Malawian contract remained silent on the ap-
plicable law and the disputes clauses, the more powerful
party gained the opportunity to determine rules ad hoc.
The termination clause was not indicated in the
Malawian contract. As shown in Table 1, in some food
supply contracts, the relationship can be automatically
terminated in the case of any or a particular type of
breach. The Malawian contract described acts that clas-
sify as a breach, without implying immediate termin-
ation as the consequence of the breach. On the other
side, the Malawian contract did not specify conditions
for terminating the agreement by either party’s free will.
Therefore, if any party intended to exit the contract in an
amicable way, the contract did not define the required
procedures, such as prior notice and the remaining li-
abilities.
Since the studied contract omitted the termination
clause, it was left to each party’s interpretation whether
the contract locked-in the parties or gave the right to exit
the contract arbitrarily. A similar case applied to force
majeure events. The contract did not foresee natural dis-
asters, which can result in delays in the delivery, reduced
quality or complete destruction of the crop. It was un-
clear how costs related to crop damage would be dis-
tributed between parties. If the force majeure clause is
not defined, it can be implied that risks and responsibil-
ities associated with unpredictable events are borne by
the farmer (Echánove & Steﬀen, 2005). The Malawian
contract as designed could introduce the risk of disputes
if natural disasters occur since each party could try to
claim indemnity rights. Possible disputes could not be
easily settled due to the lack of dispute settlement and
applicable law clauses in the Malawian contract.
One of the peculiarities of the Malawian contract was
the signatory clause. In the introductory part, the con-
tract addressed the ‘outgrower’, which could be inter-
preted as either the individual farmer or a member of
the farmers’ association. Nevertheless, the contract re-
quired the signature of the association’s representatives
to conclude the agreement. This suggests that the Com-
pany preferred to establish a relationship with the farm-
ers’ association due to numerous advantages of col-
lective action, such as the joint price negotiation, new
production practices, information sharing, better input
provision options and collective marketing of paprika
(Abebaw & Haile, 2013; Wanglin & Abdulai, 2016).
However, the membership in the farmers’ association
was not a condition to join the contract since the Com-
pany also contracted individual small-scale farmers.
This study’s findings corroborate to conclusions from
two recent studies. Prowse (2012) argued that com-
panies often fail to incorporate even basic information
in the contract, leaving farmers without an accurate idea
of the nature of the agreement they signed. The author
noted that often farmers signed contracts that could give
away their rights over the crop to the company (Prowse,
2012). Moreover, Pultrone (2012) analysed key ele-
ments of typical agricultural contracts and concluded
that more complete contracts would help each party per-
form their obligations in a more eﬃcient and eﬀective
manner and avert misunderstandings. In particular, the
inclusion of clauses on price, quantity and quality, force
majeure, termination and dispute settlement clauses add
to contract’s clarity and certainty (Pultrone, 2012).
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4.2 Learned lessons for improved contract design in
Malawi
None of the contracts analysed in Table 1 included all
the clauses needed for fair and sustainable relationships.
Some contracts reflected ’more equal’ relationship than
others and this study suggested how to improve the ex-
isting Malawian contract based on examples from the
compared contracts. The four main learned lessons from
the contract design are outlined below.
First, as the production-management type of contract,
the Malawian contract included only paprika seeds as
the provided input. If the inclusion of the entire in-
put package (seeds, fertilisers, pesticides and chemicals)
guaranteed an increase in quality and volumes of the
crop, then it would be justified to provide more in-
puts via the Malawian contract. By providing more in-
puts, the Malawian contract would resemble resource-
providing contract type such as in the example of the
Zambian and Indian contracts. Nevertheless, the threat
of small-scale farmers defaulting in repaying loans and
the higher costs for the Company might exceed the per-
ceived benefits of including the entire input package. In
this sense, additional input provision in the current con-
tract would require a thorough assessment of costs and
benefits for both parties.
Second, the Malawian contract could include an ap-
pendix with simple guidelines for grades and therefore
reduce uncertainties among small-scale farmers. In-
deed, the final CYE report (2009) on the Malawian
paprika sector recommended the development of a
unique guide for grades. The study reported on three
diﬀerent grading systems operating in the same market-
ing area, which only increased small-scale farmers’ mis-
trust towards the companies (CYE Consult, 2009).
Third, the pricing mechanism from the Cape Verdean
contract could be adjusted to serve the Malawian con-
tract. The Company could reduce small-scale farmers’
marketing risk by indicating the expected average price
for paprika in the contract. Furthermore, the price for
paprika could be modified for diﬀerent grades. The
Company could include the clause where additional re-
negotiation of the price could take place if the market
price fluctuates over or under a certain percent, which
would reduce the Company’s marketing risk. In add-
ition, the Company could set the new expected aver-
age price every season, referring to the general market
trends and previous experiences.
Fourth, the contract in Malawi should explicitly refer
to the applicable law and determine rules for contract
termination, disputes and force majeure. These clauses
could be defined as part of the contract that could be
negotiated when the need arises. Contracts from India
and Cape Verde provide an example of all four clauses
defined with no ambiguity. The proposed amendments
would mean a lengthier Malawian contract and, as
Cotula (2011) argued, longer contracts are more likely
to eﬃciently tie down financial and social aspects.
The findings showed that the Malawian contract was
designed as a production-management contract and had
eleven defined, one partially defined and five missing
clauses. The content of the Malawian contract was in
part vague and incomplete. In particular, the clauses that
were omitted from the contract influenced the risk and
power distribution and potentially weakened the small-
scale farmer’s position in the relationship. Although the
contract required the signatures of the representatives of
the farmer’s organisation, their presence did not guar-
antee better bargaining power for the small-scale farm-
ers since the joint negotiation of the contract terms was
not enabled by any contract clause. This study con-
cludes that the Malawian and other similar food sup-
ply contracts should unambiguously include (but not
be limited to) the following clauses: parties, duration,
inputs provided, grades, price and payment, quantity,
quality and delivery terms, breach and consequences, li-
abilities, termination, dispute settlement, force majeure,
applicable law and signatory.
The findings of the study involve implications for
supply chain management and policy-making.
First, the responsibility to improve the current con-
tract design in Malawi’s paprika supply chain belongs
to both the Company and contracted small-scale farm-
ers. To form complete and sustainable contracts, the
Company and small-scale farmers should interact and
negotiate terms that reasonably represent mutual and
individual interests. Third parties, including non-
governmental and aid organisations, could enhance the
farmer’s position through advocating for transparency
in the contract design and by including neutral parties in
assessing the fairness of the contract.
Second, the Malawian Government can play a part
in directing policies towards more inclusive contract
designs. Key recommendation for the policy change is
to develop and implement criteria of minimum require-
ments for contract design regarding agricultural com-
modities, especially in cases where contracts involve
vulnerable groups. The Government could incorporate
the guidelines for contract design in emerging National
Contract Farming Strategy to promote better-designed
contracts.
Third, researchers and practitioners have a role in
providing the evidence and learned lessons that enable
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adoption of advanced contract features. Based on this
study’s outputs, future research should move in several
directions. First, to estimate how the combination of dif-
ferent attributes in contract design (e.g. more input pro-
vision and stricter enforcementmechanisms) impacts on
the small-scale farmers from a financial and social per-
spective. Second, there is a need to explore contracting
companies’ perspectives on issues of contract formula-
tion. Third, to analyse countries’ policies and strategies
regarding contract design and examine the level of align-
ment with the Legal Guide by UNIDROIT/FAO/IFAD
(2015) and the Sustainable Development Goals. Fi-
nally, to pursue the UN Agenda 2030 that seeks to en-
able inclusive and sustainable economic growth through
wealth sharing and decreasing inequalities (UN, 2015),
contracts should be designed and carefully formulated
for more balanced relations, particularly where small-
scale farmers are involved in markets.
Due to context-specific conditions, caution is advised
when generalising findings on contract farming. Non-
etheless, this study compared contract samples from
Zambia, Cape Verde and India, and suggested that the
contract design in Malawi’s paprika supply chain can be
improved by learning the lessons from other countries.
The findings from this study are relevant to agricultural
policymakers and development practitioners for advan-
cing contract design that will legally protect and ensure
fair conditions for small-scale farmers.
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